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Chapter 2
THEORETICAL STUDIES
FUMIHIRO KANEKO
MANGILEP MUHAMMAD AGUNG ADY
FITRIWATI
2.1 INTRODUCTION
FUMIHIRO KANEKO
In this chapter, the theoretical studies conducted in sub-projects are reported. These
works are described extensively in the chapter 4 of Mangilep (2016b) and the chapter IV
of Fitriwati (2016a), but both of them are lled with English errors and bad writings of
mathematical expressions. They are reproduced in this chapter with a thorough editing
by Kaneko. All references to the works of other researchers are omitted, as such a section
in the draft of Fitriwati (2016a) about a relation to existing research results is eliminated
entirely. All inadequate and/or superuous contents, such as implications to a policy
making by the government and the models without a stochastic population dynamics in
the draft of Mangilep (2016b) and the appendix showing an numerical example for a wage
payment scheme by a rm in Fitriwati (2016a), are omitted. Many superuous gures are
also omitted. All errors in mathematical expressions are corrected. Though both works
are based on the ndings in the eld studies of Mangilep and Fitriwati in South Sulawesi
of Indonesia, any reference to the regional characteristics of South Sulawesi is eliminated
since the theoretical studies are to nd implications which are universally applicable once
the conditions for them are met. As a result, this chapter consists of genuine theoretical
studies conducted by Kaneko, Mangilep and Fitriwati, excluding this section.
The chapter is organized as follows. A brief comment on the contents of this chapter
is written in 2.1. The description of expository theoretical models for an adoption of
new technologies by paddy rice farmers with model cases for an adoption is in 2.2, while
2.3 consists of the description of and the solution for the model of interaction among
a rm, a local community and farmer groups in the community in the presence of an
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opportunity that farmers are employed for R&D of an agribusiness installed in the area
of the community without giving up their agricultural production. In each of 2.2 and 2.3,
the structure of subsections follows those in the chapter 4 of Mangilep (2016b) and the
chapter IV of Fitriwati (2016a), except that all contents of 4.4 in the former and of 4.2 in
the latter are eliminated.
2.2 A DECISION THEORETICAL EXPOSITION OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FARMERS?INCENTIVE
FOR PADDYRICE PRODUCTIONAND ECONOMIC
INSTITUTION TOWARD AN ADOPTION OF NEW
TECHNOLOGY
MANGILEP MUHAMMAD AGUNG ADY
FUMIHIRO KANEKO eds.
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this section, a relationship between farmers' agricultural productions and a rural eco-
nomic institution is exposed theoretically. The objective of this theoretical exposition is to
explain a relationship between agricultural productions and a rural economic institution
in which farmers make a sophisticated decision on associating various part of their agri-
cultural productions with dierent economic systems. The expository decision model is
based on a role of paddy rice production. A paddy rice production can be associated with
either the formal sector or the informal sector of the economic institution. The purpose of
a paddy rice production can be not only for a commercial one but also for other purposes
such as preserving the agricultural land and preserving the asset value for the family of
a farmer. Farmers have their own focal sectors, on which they choose which sector their
paddy rice production should be associated with, either the formal sector or the informal
sector, or both of them. A farmer?s decision criterion for an adoption of new technologies
in the paddy rice production is provided for each case of his focal sector, and decision
criteria are proposed for switching of focal sectors. It is assumed that farmers produce rice
every year and that they also produce other agricultural products such as water bualo,
red onion and plantation products. They manage their agricultural productions with a
decision based on their knowledge of the agricultural production and the market informa-
tion. The relevant information for making such a decision varies with their focal sector.
Dierent focal sector gives dierent informational criterion to farmers.
Farmers' willingness to adopt new technologies depends on their incentive. It is a
protability of a paddy production if the production is associated with the formal sector,
or is a contribution to the family's economic welfare if it is associated with the informal
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sector. If the degree of incentive is at or beyond a critical level, farmers will adopt new
technologies. The adoption of new technologies is judged on a series of information about
benets to adopt ones. Let Q 2 R be an index of incentive toward an adoption of new
technologies for a paddy rice production. Let a vector a 2 Rm represent a prole of either
productions or stocks of agricultural products at the end of a period. It is assumed that
the incentive index is determined by a n-proles of either productions or stocks in the
(n  1) past periods and the current period. This relation is represented by a function f ,
hence Q = f(at (n 1); at (n 2); :::; at). Let us assume that f(0n) = 0 when 0n = (0; : : : ; 0| {z }
n
).
Let Q be the threshold degree of incentive index at which new technologies are adopted
and a be the n-proles that achieves Q, Q = f(a).
It is further assumed that f(at (n 1); : : : ; a0) to be either 1n
Pn
k=0 I(at k) or
minfI(at k)jk = 0; : : : ; n  1g where I(a) represents an index of the information relevant
for adoption of new technologies, which is a function of a prole of either productions or
stocks, depending on the focal sector of a farmer.
2.2.2 EXPOSITORY DECISION MODEL FOR THE CASE THAT A
FARMER'S FOCAL SECTOR IS THE FORMAL ONE
This subsection exposes how a farmer makes a decision to adopt new technologies when
his focal sector is the formal one. The model makes the protability of a commercial
production to dominate others in information. Farmers will adopt new technologies for
paddy rice productions led by an experience of commercial production of rice and other
crops such as red onion and plantation products, and cattle like water bualoes. If farmers
see a positive trend of return from paddy rice production in the long-run and that trend
is higher than the maximum returns from production of other crops and cattle, they will
adopt new technologies on a paddy rice production.
Let c represents an agricultural product that can be trade in the market. There are
four such products, rice (r), red onion (o), water bualo (b) and plantation products
(p). Hence c 2 fr; o; b; pg. Let at 2 R4+ be a vector of produced amounts of these four
agricultural products in period t. Let Rc be the return for the commercial production of
crop c. It is assumed that missing data by no commercial production is substituted with
the dummy return with the market price index in that period and the constant marginal
cost of production for a standard commercial production, for each crop. Let pc be the
market price index of c and ec be the constant marginal cost for a standard commercial
production of c. If the crop c is not produced commercially, substitute Rc with pc ecec . It
is also denoted as Rc.
Information about the return on a commercial production of paddy rice is dened by
Ir  RrmaxfRo;Rb;Rpg . Information about the return on a crop c other than paddy rice is
dened similarly.
In each period t, Rtc denotes the return on a commercial production of crop c in that
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period. In case that the crop c is not produced commercially in period t, it is estimated
with the market price index and the constant marginal cost of a standard commercial
production in period t. Information about the return on a commercial production of crop
c in period t is calculated with the use of Rtc's, and is denoted as I
t
c. It is assumed that
the market price index and the marginal cost of commercial production for each crop is
constant through time, so that Rtc and I
t
c are determined by a prole of productions in
period t.
Let Qtr be dened by either
1
n
Pn 1
k=0 I
t k
r or minft   kkk = 0; :::; n   1g, exclusively.
Then Qtc for c 6= r is dened similarly.
Let a^r;t  (ar;t (n 1); : : : ; ar;t) be n-proles of productions up to period t such that all
crops are commercially produced in every period without introducing any new technology
with minfIt kr jk = 0; : : : ; n 1g = Q where Q  maxfIt kc jc 6= r and k = 0; : : : ; n 1g.
It is assumed that ar;s can be taken constantly for all s and denoted it as ar . Then a^r;t
does not depend on t, and it is denoted as a^r . The prole ar represents a model case of
commercial agricultural production whose repetition makes a situation in which a paddy
rice production dominates those of other crops in relative superiority. It is also assumed
there is no uncertainty for achieving the production target ar .
Assume that, if Qtr > maxf Qtcjc 6= rg in period t, the farmer accepts to adopt the prole
of productions ar as the production target for the next year. Then, in period (t+1), the n-
proles of productions becomes a^t+1 = (at (n 2); : : : ; at; ar). If Qt+1r > maxf Qt+1c jc 6= rg
in period (t+1), the farmer continues to adopt ar as the production target for the next year.
In period (t + 2), the n-proles of productions becomes a^t+2 = (at (n 3); : : : ; at; ar ; ar).
By continuing in this way, if Qt+kr > maxf Qt+kc jc 6= rg for all k = 0; : : : ; n   1, the n-
proles of productions in period (t+(n 1)) becomes a^r . Since Qt+(n 1) = Q, the farmer
adopts new technologies for a paddy rice production in period (t+n). If those technologies
secure that It+nr  It+(n 1)r , the farmer will continue to adopt new technologies for paddy
rice production regardless of a comparison between Qt+nr and maxfIt+nc jc 6= rg, since the
improvement of It+nc for c 6= r can be brought only by adopting new technologies for paddy
rice production if it exists.
A farmer may switch his focal sector from the formal one to the informal one, when he
is inclined to seek a satisfaction from agricultural activity, rather than monetary income.
The decision for switching is triggered by getting jobs other than agriculture for his income
source, and a switch will be made if the income from these jobs become more than enough
to maintain his family's cost of living but he has no intention of giving up his agricultural
activity.
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2.2.3 EXPOSITORY DECISION MODEL FOR THE CASE THAT A
FARMER'S FOCAL SECTOR IS THE INFORMAL ONE
This subsection exposes how a farmer makes a decision to adopt new technology when
his focal sector is the informal one. Farmers may adopt new technologies for their paddy
rice productions in pursuing economic welfare of their families beyond covering the costs of
children education and health care. In relation to the informal sector, farmers' perception
of life is greatly inuenced by social customs of the society to which they belong, which has
been developed by social interactions of their ancestors in the society for a long period of
time. Such interactions might have been quite complex in their nature, but they are based
on a postulate that an agricultural production should be sustained as much as possible.
Hence farmers would like to keep their agricultural production as long as the economic
environment supports it. It is assumed that the center of agricultural production is paddy
rice, with a breeding of water bualoes being the second important activity. It is assumed
that, in order to maintain their rice stocks for a satisfactory economic welfare under
population and productivity shocks, farmers improve continuously their traditional paddy
rice production both in quality and in quantity. They will try to adopt new technologies
only by insuring that action with their traditional paddy rice production. It is expected
that most of those farmers who can do it are the big land owners. Many small-scale
farmers would not be able to maintain the stock of agricultural products at a sucient
level for yielding a decent economic welfare, and some would choose to leave their home
villages and seek other jobs at nearby villages and cities. The rest have no other options
than increasing their commercial productions to make a living by monetary income, so
that they would switch their focal sector to the formal one.
Let Q represent to be an index for economic welfare of a farmer ?s family. Three
thresholds on Q are introduced in the increasing order of scale as follows.
I 0 = the threshold below which a farmer commercializes his paddy rice production.
I 0 =
(
the threshold where farmer is interested in adopting new technology
for the rice production.
I 0 =
(
the threshold where adopting new technologies for the rice production
becomes fully condent.
An adoption of new technologies makes sense only if Q > I 0, since it makes the degree of
condence on adopting new technologies to be positive. If Q  I 0, an adoption of new
technologies is never considered. The degree of condence on adopting new technologies
becomes full (namely, 1) only if Q  I 0.
Social welfare cost in terms of money is denoted as S. Economic welfare in relation to
the informal sector is determined by the way how the agricultural community to which the
farmer belong follows their customary obligations. Only rice (r) and water bualo (b) can
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contribute to economic welfare in relation to the informal sector. A paddy rice production
is important for farmers' life as an activity to secure their main food and as a part of their
tangible and/or intangible traditional assets. A breeding of water bualo is important
because they are used in traditional funeral ceremonies. A proper conduct of a funeral
ceremony is considered to be very important in their agricultural community. Farmers have
no interest in producing rice and/or water bualo commercially if the economic welfare
after their sales to cover S is acceptable to them.
There are (n + 1)-grades on the quality of stocked rice indexed by numbers 0; : : : ; n.
The larger the index numbers is, the higher the quality of rice is. Stocked rices and a
harvested rice are characterized by the quality and the quantity. Let Qtr 2 Rn+1+ be the
initial stock vector of rice in period t. Its k-th component is the amount of stocked rice
with the quality k, and is denoted as Qt;kr . At the beginning of the period, a farmer sells
rice in the market in order to cover the social welfare cost S. A farmer sells the lowest
quality rice at rst. If the sales revenue is not enough to cover S, he sells the rice with a
quality one rank higher, and so on. The sales price of rice is the minimum market price
in the period, which is random and is denoted as ~P
t
. After the sales of rice is nished,
the farmer's family start to consume rice from its stock. They prefer to consume rice with
quality as high as possible. Then the paddy rice production starts. Before adopting new
technologies, the rice production is performed with a traditional method. However, an
experiment of new technologies is always feasible by allocating a small part of his land
and eort for it. The paddy rice is harvested at the end of the period. All harvested rices
produced with the same method has the same random quality and quantity. They are
added to the stock of rice, and all old rices in the stock except that with the lowest grade
quality have a vintage down, which is a drop of the quality by one grade. This determines
the initial stock vector of rice in period (t+ 1).
A technology of paddy rice production depends endogenously on labor for the rice
production, the total service of agricultural land owned or managed by a farmer, and the
standard per capita productivity of rice production with the method. It is also inuenced
exogenously by a noise factor, such as a climate condition. All of these factors are poten-
tially stochastic, though the total service of agricultural land is assumed to be constant
through time with a traditional method. The labor for the rice production is made ran-
dom by a stochastic population dynamics. The per capita productivity is assumed to be
a function of the labor for the paddy rice production and the total service of agricultural
land, hence it is randomized by a stochastic population dynamics. With new technologies
in an experiment, the total service of agricultural land becomes random too. Such an
experiment also makes random eects on both quality and quantity of harvested rice.
Let ~`tr denote the random population of labor for the rice production in period t. It is
assumed that the population follows a random walk with reection barriers ` and `(` < `).
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Let p be the stationary probability that one working person in the family dies in a period.
Let  be a stationary probability that one person who can work on elds is added to the
family. If ` < `t 1r < `,
~`t
r =
8><>:
`t 1r   1 with the probability p(1  ),
`t 1r with the probability p,
`t 1r + 1 with the probability (1  p).
If `t 1r = `, one person is taken out of the family if no member of the family dies, so that
~`t
r = `  1 with probability 1. If `t 1r = `, at least one person is brought into the family
with two if a member of the family dies, so that ~`tr = `+ 1 with probability 1.
Let ~t denote the potentially random total service of agricultural land owned or man-
aged by a farmer in period t. With a traditional method, it is kept constant at . Let
qr = (`r; ) be the function that determines the per capita productivity of a paddy rice
production by a labor for the production and a total service of the agricultural land. Given
any , it is assumed that (:; ) is concave and maximized at `r(). It is also assumed
that (`r; :) is increasing for any given `r and `r() is increasing with respect to . The
random per capita productivity for paddy rice production in period t is denoted as ~qtr, and
is determined by ~qtr = (~`
t
r; ~). Let ~
t denote an exogenous random noise factor on paddy
rice production, which includes a climate condition and a natural disaster.
A technology of paddy rice production is represented by a production function f :
R4  ! Rn+1+ . Its variables are a labor on the rice production (`r), a total service of
agricultural land owned or managed by a farmer (), a per capita productivity of rice
production (qr) and an exogenous noise (). The components of its value are all zero except
for one component. Let k(`r; ; qr; ) be the quality grade of produced rice corresponding to
(`r; ; qr; ). Let y(`r; ; qr; ) be the quantity of produced rice corresponding to (`r; ; qr; ).
A production function for a paddy rice production is given by
fk(`r; ; qr; ) =
(
y(`r; ; qr; ) if k = k(`r; ; qr; ),
0 otherwise,
for all k = 0; : : : ; n.
A process of change in the rice stock in a period t with a traditional paddy rice
production is as follows. It is Qtr at the beginning of period t. Let k( ~P
t
; Qtr) be the highest
grade of quality for the rice sold for covering S. The rice stock after the sales of low quality
rice, denoted as ~Qtr( ~P
t
; Qtr), is given by
~Qt;kr ( ~P
t
; Qtr) =
8>><>>:
0 if k < k( ~P
t
; Qtr),Pk( ~P t;Qtr)
k0=0 Q
t;k0
r   S~P t if k = k( ~P
t
; Qtr),
Qt;kr if k > k( ~P
t
; Qtr),
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for all k = 0; : : : ; n. At this moment, if a farmer cannot cover S by sales of entire stocked
rice, he turns his focal sector to the formal one in the next period. Suppose that is not the
case. It is assumed that each family member consumes  units of rice so that total family
consumption of rice in quantity is   ~`tr. If Qtr is suciently rich, it will be the case thatP
k = 0n ~Qtr( ~P
t
; Qtr) >   ~`tr. If this is not the case, the farmer turns his focal sector to
the formal one in the next period. Suppose that the farmer's family does not starve. Let
k(~ltr; ~Q
t
r) be the lowest grade of rice quality that is consumed by the family of a farmer,
where ~Qtr( ~P
t
; Qtr) is abbreviated as ~Q
t
r. The rice stock after the self-consumption, denotes
as ~~Qtr(~`
t
r; Q
t
r) is given by
~~Qt;kr (~`
t
r; Q
t
r) =
8><>:
0 if k > k(~ltr; ~Q
t
r),Pn
k=k(~`tr;
~Qtr)
~Qt;kr    ~`tr if k = k(~`tr; ~Qtr),
~Qt;kr if k < k(~`tr; ~Q
t
r),
for all k = 0; : : : ; n. At the end of period t, harvested rice from a traditional produc-
tion is added to the rice stock, so that rice stock at the end of period t is ~~Qtr(~`
t
r; Q
t
r) +
f( ~ell
t
r; ; ~q
t
r; ~
t). Then the old rices suers a vintage down, so that the initial rice stock in
period (t+ 1), Qt+1r , is given by
Qt+1;kr =
8>><>>:
~~Qt;0r +
~~Qt;1r if k = 0,
y(~`tr; ; ~q
t
r; ~) +
~~Qt;k(
~`t
r;;~q
t
r;~)+1
r if k = k(~`tr; ; ~q
t
r; ~),
~~Qt;k+1r if k 6= 0; k(~`tr; ; ~qtr; ~),
where ~~Qtr(~`
t
r; Q
t
r) is abbreviated as
~~Qtr and
~~Qt;n+1r  0.
Let ur : Rn+1 ! R be a basic utility function for a rice stock at the end of a pe-
riod. The expected utility for rice stock at the end of period t is Ur(~`tr; ; ~q
t
r; ~P
t
; ~t;Qt) =
E[ur(
~~Qtr(~`
t
r; Q
t
r) + f(~`
t
r; ; ~q
t
r; ~
t))].
A funeral ceremony must be conducted properly by a farmer when a person in his family
dies. When a family member dies, one water bualo is sacriced for his/her funeral. Let
qb() be the maximum number of water bualoes needed for eld works with the total
service of agricultural land . It is assumed that the number of water bualoes bred with
the total service of agricultural land , denoted as qb(), is equal to qb() + 1. Let Uf
be the utility from conducting a proper funeral, and cb be the constant marginal cost of
breeding a water bualo in terms of utility. Then a farmer's utility from water bualo
breeding with a traditional paddy rice production is p(Uf   cbqb())  (1  p)cb(qb()+1),
which is constant through time.
The spot economic welfare of a farmer with a traditional paddy rice production in
period t, denoted as V t, is given by
V t  E[ur( ~~Qtr(~`tr; Qtr) + f(~`tr; ; ~qtr; ~t))] + p(Uf   cbqb())  (1  p)cb(qb() + 1) (2.1)
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Let It  V t. Then Qt is either 1n
Pn 1
k=0 I
t k or minfIt+kjk = 0; : : : ; n  1g.
A farmer makes experiments to evaluate new technologies. The farmer recognizes the
eect of implementing new technology as follows. An eect on production is given by
(~; ~; ~). The random variable ~ is a random eect on the quality of harvested rice in
the experiment of new technologies. It takes its value in f 1; 0; 1g and the probability of
f~ = 1g is higher than that of f~ =  1g. The random variable ~ is a random eect on the
quantity of harvested rice in the experiment. It takes its value in the interval ( 1; 1), and
it is assumed that E(~) > 0 and 0 < Probf~>0gProbf~>0g <  where  > 0 is very small. The output
of rice production in the experiment is (1 + ~)y(`r; ; qr; ). The random variable  is a
random eect on the service provided by the agricultural land that the farmer owns, in
the experiment. It takes its value in the interval ( 1; 1), and it is assumed that E(~) > 0
and 0 < Probf
~>0g
Probf~>0g < . The service provided by the agricultural land in the experiment
is (1 + ~).
Let ~f 0(`r; ; (`r; ); ) denote the production function based on the experiment. It is
given by
~f 0k(`r; ; qr; )
=
(
(1 + ~)y(`r; (1 + ~); (`r; (1 + ~)); ; ) if k = k(`r; (1 + ~); (`r; (1 + ~)); ; ) + ~,
0 otherwise.
Under the experiment, the economic welfare in period t is
E[ur( ~f 0(~`tr; (1+ ~); (~`
t
r; (1+ ~); ~
t)+ ~~Qtr(~`
t
r; ~Q
t
r)]+p(Uf   cbqb())  (1 p)cb(qb()+1):
In period t, the data from experiments in the current period and past (n  1)-periods,
(t k; t k; t k)n 1k=0 , is observed by the farmer. Let (:j(t k; t k; t k)n 1k=0) be the em-
pirical probability on (~; ~; ~) derived from the data. For a simplicity, it is assumed that
the empirical probability is independent of (~`t kr ; ~P
t k
; ~t k)n 1k=0 . The spot welfare in pe-
riod t based on the experience of consecutive experiments for n periods, denotes as V 0t is
given by
V 0t = E
h
E[ur( ~f 0(~`tr; (1 + ~); (~`tr; (1 + ~); ~t) +
~~Qtr(~`
t
r;
~Qtr)]
i
+p(Uf   cbqb())  (1  p)cb(qb() + 1):
(2.2)
Let I 0t  V 0t. Assume, without loss of generality, that the farmer starts to experiment
the eect of implementing new technologies at the period 0. Let t  n. Let I 0t =
maxfI 0t kjk = 0; : : : ; n  1g and I 0t k = minfI 0t kjk = 0; : : : ; n  1g. If Qt 2 [I 0t k; I 0t k],
then let Conf( Qt) be dened by
Qt I0t k
I0t k I0t k . If
Qt < I 0t k, let Conf( Qt) = 0. If Qt > I 0t k,
let Conf( Qt) = 1. The farmer regards an adoption of new technologies as acceptable in
period t only if Conf( Qt) > 0. So assume, without loss of generality, that Q0 > 0.
In the period T > n   1, let DT (:) be the empirical distribution of Conf( Qt) for t =
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T   (n   1); : : : ; T . Let T be the mean of DT (:) and T be the standard deviation of
DT (:).
Let J : [0; 1] [0; 1]  ! R be a judgment function on condence in new technologies. It
is assumed that J(:; ) is increasing and J(; :) is decreasing. Given (T ; T ), the judgment
on condence in technologies is given by J(T ; T ). Let J be the threshold value for
judgment above which the farmer adopts new technologies. A farmer implements the new
technologies in period (T +1) if and only if J(T ; T )  J. However this implementation
should be only for one-time adoption since it is unrealistic that a farmer continue to adopt
new technologies when the estimated welfare with experiments on new technologies is
constantly below that with a traditional production.
2.3 A THEORETICAL MODEL ON THE ROLE OF AN
INTEGRATION OF PALM OIL PLANTATIONWITH
R&D AND MANUFACTURING OF PHA IN A LO-
CAL COMMUNITY
FITRIWATI
FUMIHIRO KANEKO eds.
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
This section investigates the feasibility of hiring locals to Research and Development
(R&D) activities directly at a palm oil plantation rm that integrates R&D and manufac-
turing of Polyhydroxyalkanoates (PHA), in a model of interaction among a rm, a local
community and farmer groups in the local community. The goal is to show theoretically
that under some condition, a peer eect created by the local community works positively
for installing the business in which locals are employed for R&D of PHA without abandon-
ing local agricultural activities. The model is to identify the mechanism that a cooperative
eect needed for sustaining R&D is guaranteed by the interaction between the community
and the farmer groups. The model gives an example of a mechanism by which a traditional
life in rural areas based on agriculture can co-exist with R&D of PHA, in which locals also
engage.
The objective of the research is to rationalize the employment of locals to R&D activity.
All economic agents, a rm, a local community, and farmer groups are involved in an
interaction associated with an installation of R&D for PHA, and farmers must be satised
with their employment for R&D activity.
2.3.2 THE MODEL AND ROLES OF ECONOMIC AGENTS
In this subsection, an interaction model between the local community, farmer groups and
the rm is developed. The goal is to model that the local community controls a peer
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eect to coordinate actions of farmer groups in the presence of an opportunity to be hired
for R&D of PHA. The local community controls a cooperative behavior of locals with
a community signal. The rm gures out an average eort from farmers on R&D and
an estimated wage payment ex-ante if the local community identies itself with the rm.
It is to be proved that the local community can achieve a level of cooperation among
locals sucient for the rm to operate R&D. It is expected that a local community has
a chance to make locals employed in the R&D division if it can create a strong peer
eect in a positive way. There are two mechanisms to create the peer eect, a positive
mechanism and a negative mechanism. A positive mechanism comes from the spirit of
entrepreneurship and creativity by the young generation in a local community to encourage
their cooperative behavior, while a negative mechanism comes from a kind of coercion from
the old generation to the young generation. If a mechanism is proper, a peer eect will be
created in the spirit of enhancing entrepreneurship. If it is not proper, a bad feeling will
be caused among farmers by a peer eect. In the model, the local community gives the
signal about the average level of eorts on R&D to the each farmer group, which is used
as an instrument to control a peer eect.
2.3.2.1 ROLES OF ECONOMIC AGENTS AND INTERACTION BETWEEN
LOCAL COMMUNITY AND FARMER GROUP
In this study, there are three types of players interacting on an installment of an inte-
gration of palm oil plantation with R&D and manufacturing of PHA. They are a rm, a
local community, and farmer groups in the local community. The way how they interact
is shown in the gure 2.1.
Firm
m
m;w
w
Local Community
Farmer Groups
1 (i1 )
N
i=1
Figure 2.1: Interaction among a rm, a local community and farmer groups
The local community controls the cooperative behavior among farmer groups with a
signal to control a peer eect, where the signal represents an average level of eorts on
R&D taken by other farmer groups, for each farmer group. The rm is assumed to have a
willingness to install R&D for PHA in the area of the local community. The rm intends
to employ locals for R&D. It makes the description of jobs and its wage payment policy
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public to the local community and the farmer groups. The rm has no direct access to
each farmer group, and rely on the local community for information on the willingness
to make eorts for R&D by farmer groups. The rm knows that the local community
can coordinate the action of farmer groups through a peer eect, but does not know
how it works. The rm is ready to oer an incentive to the local community to share the
information about the willingness to make eorts on R&D by farmer groups. The incentive
of farmer groups for making eorts at the R&D division is inuenced by the wage payment
scheme in an indirect way through the interaction between the local community and farmer
groups. Each farmer group know the agricultural technology used by other farmer groups
but does not knows how much eort other groups put in R&D. Each farmer group takes
a signal from the local community as the average eorts on R&D to be implemented by
other groups. Through a job opportunity at the R&D division oered by a rm, farmers
retain their discretion for engaging in agricultural activities, so that they are not be forced
to abandon them.
In the following, the behavioral models of a rm, a local community and farmer groups
are described each by each under several structural assumptions. It is assumed that
there are two mechanisms for creating peer eect, a positive mechanism and a negative
mechanism. A judgment on mechanisms by the local community depends on its utility
function. The local community signals an average level of eort on R&D that it thinks
the best. The optimal level depends on the status quo level, which the local community
regards as realizable with no social cost. It is also assumed that there are 5 farmer
groups and the rm operates the business for 9 years. If all farmer groups work in R&D
division, it means that there are no congestion in the use of agricultural infrastructures.
If every farmer groups work for agricultural activities in full time, it means that there
is an enormous congestion in the use of agricultural infrastructure that will restrict their
agricultural production severely. In such case, the wage payment by the rm is attractive
for farmer groups whose marginal utilities of income are high.
2.3.2.2 THE MODEL OF THE FIRM
Firm's objectives is to sustain the average eort level on R&D no less than the level
needed for an operation of R&D at which the operation goes smoothly.
A wage payment scheme is elaborated to provide a nancial incentive to farmer groups
as employees in the R&D division. Since there are 5 farmer groups, 5 job grades are set up.
Each job grade has 3 job steps, so that there are total 15 job steps. A promotion makes an
employee to step up by one. A promotion policy species the length of months to the next
promotion. Since the rm operates for 9 years (108 months), the factorization of 108 in
prime numbers as 2233 gives 9 potential candidates for a promotion policy. Among them
those less than 6-months require far more than 15 steps, so that they are eliminated from
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candidates. Those more than 6-months (9,12,18,27,36,108) require less than 12 steps, so
that they are feasible. A promotion policy of 6-months is acceptable with the maxed-out
at the top job step for the last 18 months. Hence there are 7 promotion policies. The
wage payment is based on monthly salary (no bonus), and a promotion brings 12:5% salary
increase. The starting salary is chosen to be no less than the minimum salary for R&D
workers nationwide wr. The eorts of employees vary in the interval [0; 1], and the rm
sets up its partition by 7 subintervals, each of which corresponds to a promotion policy
exclusively. It is assumed that the true level of eort can be observed by the rm.
Let w be the starting monthly salary satisfying w  wr. Promotion policies are
numbered in the increasing order of lengths to the next promotion, and the length to the
next promotion under the promotion policy i is denotes as Xi. For the promotion policy
i with i  2, the total wage payment for 9 years, Wi, is calculated as
Wi = wXi(1 + : : :+ (1:125)
108
Xi
 1)
= wXi(1:125)
108
Xi
 1 1 + : : :+   11:125 108Xi  1
= wXi(1:125)
108
Xi
 1 1 ( 11:125)
108
Xi
1 ( 11:125)
For the promotion policy 1, the total wage payment for 9 years, W1, is calculated as
W1 = wXi(1 + : : :+ (1:125)14 + 3(1:125)14)
= wXi(1:125)14

1 + : : :+
 
1
1:125
14 + 3
= wXi(1:125)14

1 ( 11:125)
15
1 ( 11:125)
+ 3

:
Let Ii be the subinterval of [0; 1] corresponding to the promotion policy i. The length of
Ii, denoted as jIij, is given by
jIij = W1 + : : :+Wi7W1 + 6W2 + : : :+W7 :
Hence Ii = [Zi; Zi 1) where Z7 = 0 and, for i = 1; : : : ; 6,
Zi = Zi+1 +
W1 + : : :+Wi
7W1 + 6W2 + : : :+W7
:
If an observed eort of a worker is in the subinterval Ii, the promotion policy i is applied
to the worker. The partition of [0; 1] is visualized in the gure 2.2.
Let  be the level of average eort on R&D at which the operation of R&D goes
smoothly. Suppose that the rm can obtain the true information on the average level of
eort that farmer groups put on R&D from the local community by paying an incentive
m to them. Let 1 be this average level. The rm controls the starting wage w and the
incentive payment m to achieve 1   under the ex-ante budget constraint
m+ w(1)  ;
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Figure 2.2: Promotion system for the R&D division
where w(1) is the total wage payment to an R&D worker whose eort on R&D is 1), and
 is the total budget size for the R&D division which is determined by the headquarter of
the rm and is xed.
2.3.2.3 THE MODEL OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY
The objective of the local community is modeled as
Max12[0;1] [M+(1)]
B[M (1)]1 B;
where
M+ = (1  )(m+ 0) + 51;
M  = (1 + )(m+ 0)  51:
The local community uses 1 to signal an average level of eort for R&D taken by other
farmer groups to each farmer group. There is a level of status quo 0 in total eort for
R&D which can be realized without any social cost. The coecient  2 (0; 1) is a xed
strength on the eect of a positive deviation of total eort for R&D from (m+0) in each
mechanism. The coecient B is the degree of preference on the positive side of a peer
eect.
By the denition of M+ and M ,
M+ = 2(m+ 0) M :
Hence the problem is reduced to
Max(M+;M )0 M
B
+M
1 B
  s.t. M+ +M  = 2(m+ 0):
The solution for this problem is
M+ = 2B(m+ 0);
M  = 2(1 B)(m+ 0):
The value of the problem is BB(1 B)1 M  2(m+ 0). By solving for the denition of
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either M+ or M , the solution
1 =
2B   (1  )(m+ 0)
5
:
It is positive and increasing with respect to (m+ 0) if B > 1 2 , which is assumed from
now on. The value of (1  ) represents the degree of inertia in the local community.
2.3.2.4 THE MODEL OF FARMER GROUPS
The objective of a farmer group i is modeled as
Maxi12[0;1] exp
0@min(0;    i(1  i1) X
j 6=i
j(1  1))
1A exp(1  i1)
+ i
7X
j=1
wj1Ij (
i
1) given 1,
where i1 is the per-capita level of eort for R&D by farmers in the group i, i is the
marginal utility of money for the group i, j is the service of agricultural infrastructure
for the farmer group j (j = 1; : : : ; 5). The function exp(1   i) represents a satisfaction
from agricultural activity if there is no congestion in the use of agricultural infrastructure.
It is assumed that j is more than 1, for each j. The term
P
j 6=i j(1  1) is the use
of agricultural infrastructure services by the farmer groups other than i. A degradation
of agricultural infrastructure services caused by a congestion of their use is represented
by exp

min(0;    i(1  i1) 
P
j 6=i j(1  1))

, where  is the constant full capacity
of the agricultural infrastructure. The value of 1 will inuence the decision of farmer
groups. If it is low, the value of exp

min(0;    i(1  i1) 
P
j 6=i j(1  1))

is reduced
to be less than 1. However, if it is not too low, there are much room in the agricultural
infrastructure services and the farmer group would not need to worry about the agricultural
infrastructure.
2.3.3 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FARMERGROUPS AND LO-
CAL COMMUNITY
In this subsection, the interaction between farmer groups and local community is de-
scribed. The optimal level of eort for R&D is determined by each farmer group based
on a given community signal. The resulting average level of eort for R&D over farmer
groups becomes a status quo for the local community in the next round of interaction.
Note that the objective function of the farmer group i is written as
exp
24(1  i1) + min
0@0;    i(1  i1) X
j 6=i
j(1  1)
1A35+ i 7X
j=1
wj1Ij (
i
1):
38 CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL STUDIES
If the value of

   i(1  i1) 
P
j 6=i j(1  1)

is negative, then
(1  i1) + min

0;    i(1  i1) 
P
j 6=i j(1  1)

= (1  i1) +    i(1  i1) 
P
j 6=i j(1  1)
= (1  i)(1  i1) +
h
  Pj 6=i j(1  1)i :
If ~i1 can be taken so that i(1   ~i1) =   
P
j 6=i j(1   1), then there is no incentive
for the farmer group i to choose i1 less than ~
i
1, since the condition i > 1 implies that,
if i1 increases in the range less than or equal to ~
i
1, the satisfaction from the agricultural
activity increases and the wage income also increases. So the constraint for the use of
agricultural infrastructure is never binding,
i(1  i1)    
X
j 6=i
j(1  1);
or
1  i1 
  Pj 6=i j(1  1)
i
 Ai(1):
(Note that Ai(1) is equal to (1  ~i1). ) The value of Ai(1) is increasing with respect to
1.
It is assumed that
j > 1 for all j = 1; : : : ; 5,
 >
P
j 6=i j for all i = 1; : : : ; 5,
 <
P5
j=1 j :
For 1 2 [0; 1], the assumption implies that Ai(i) > 0. However, it does not guarantee
that Ai(i)  1.
The choice of (1  i1) is bounded above by Ai(i). Since i1 2 [0; 1], 1  i1  Ai(i)
is automatically satised if Ai(i)  1. This inequity is, therefore, binding only for the
case that Ai(i) < 1. By the denition of Ai(i) < 1,
Ai(1) S 1() 1  1 T    iP
j 6=i j
(double-sign corresponds).
The case Ai(i) < 1 is called as the case 1, while the case Ai(i)  1 is called as the case
2. For a further argument, let's introduce 0, 
j
1 (j = 1; : : : ; 5), 

1 dened by
j1  augmax fexp(1  Zk) + jwk jk = 1; : : : ; 7g (j = 1; : : : ; 5),
0 
P5
j=1 
j
1
5 ;
1  2B (1 )(m+

0)
5 :
Case 1
In this case, 1   1 >  iP
j 6=i j
. Let ki(1) 2 f1; : : : ; 7g be such that 1   Ai(1) 2
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Iki(1). Then the choice set for 
i
1 is

Z1; : : : ; Zki(1) 1; 1 Ai(1)
	
. If i1 = Zk for
k 2 f1; : : : ; ki(1) 1g, its utility is exp(1 Zk)+iwk. If i1 = 1 Ai(1), its utility
is exp(Ai(1)) + iwki(1). Note that, if 
i
1 2

Z1; : : : ; Zki(1) 1
	
, i1 is chosen by
the farmer group i. If i1 62

Z1; : : : ; Zki(1) 1
	
, the optimal i1 is greater than or
equal to i1 , with the strict inequality if Ai(1) 6= 1   Zki(1). If i is small, then
i1 tends to be small. For such a farmer group i, the second case would occur. In
any case, P5
j=1 
j
1
5
 0;
with the strict inequality if i1 62

Z1; : : : ; Zki(1) 1
	
for some i with Ai(1) 6=
1  Zki(1).
If the equality holds, it means that each farmer group j chooses j1 . In the next
round of interaction, 0 is replaced by 0 so that the signal is 1. If Ai(1)  1, then
the process goes to the case 2. To simplify the argument, assume (temporarily) that
this is not the case for all farmer groups. Then the case 1 repeats with the community
signal 1 for all farmer groups. If i1 > 1 Ai(1), then the farmer group i chooses
i1 . Otherwise i1  i1 is chosen with the strict inequality if Ai(1) 6= 1  Zki(1).
If the former is true for all farmer groups, then the interaction is stabilized, in that
each farmer group i chooses i1 in any rounds following this round. Suppose it is
not the case, so that i1 < 1 Ai(1) for some i. For such i, its choice is i1 > i1 .
Let ~i1 be dened for each i by
~i1  augmax
n
exp(1  Z) + iwk
Z 2 nZ1; : : : ; Zki(1) 1; 1 Ai(1)o ; o :
Then i1 = ~
i
1 > 
i
1 . For other j's with 
j
1  1  Aj(1), their choice is j1 = ~j1.
Therefore j1 2 [j1 ; ~j1] for all farmer groups j = 1; : : : ; 5. In the next round,
0 > 

0, so that 1 > 

1 which implies 1 Aj(1) < 1 Aj(1) for all j = 1; : : : ; 5.
For all i with i1  1 Aj(1), its choice is i1 . Note that, for them, i1 = ~i1. For
all i with 1 Ai(1)  i1 < 1 Ai(1), its choice is i1 , and ~i1 > i1 . For all i with
i1 < 1  Ai(1), its choice i1 satises i1 < i1  ~i1. Hence, again, j1 2 [j1 ; ~j1]
for all farmer groups j = 1; : : : ; 5. In the next round, 0  0. If 0 = 0, the
rst case in this paragraph repeated. If 0 > 0,the second case in this paragraph
applies to this round. In any case, j1 2 [j1 ; ~j1] for all farmer groups j = 1; : : : ; 5,
so that 0  0 in the next round.
If the inequality holds, 0 > 0 in the next round and the community signal 1
satises 1 > 1, so that Ai(1) > Ai(1). If Ai(1)  1, then the process goes
to the case 2. To simplify the argument, assume (temporarily) that this is not the
case for all farmer groups. Then the case 1 repeats for all farmer groups. This case
corresponds to the second case in the previous paragraph. Hence j1 2 [j1 ; ~j1] for
all farmer groups j = 1; : : : ; 5, and 0  0 in the next round. After this round, the
40 CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL STUDIES
interactions proceeds exactly as those described in the previous paragraph.
Let ~0 and ~1 be dened by
~0 
P5
j=1 ~
j
1
5 ;
~1  2B (1 )(m+~0)5 :
The argument so far shows that, in any round of interaction, the status quo value
0, the community signal 1 and optimal choices of farmer groups
n
j1
o5
j=1
satisfy
0  0  ~0; (2.3)
1  1  ~1; (2.4)
and
j1 2
h
j1 ; ~
j
1
i
for all j = 1; : : : ; 5. (2.5)
Case 2
In this case, 1  1   iP
j 6=i j
. Since Ai(1)  1, the optimal choice of farmer group
i is i1 . Hence this case does not aect on the argument for the case 1, and the
properties (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) holds for any round of interaction even if the case 2
happens to some farmer groups.
2.3.4 ANALYSIS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRM AND LO-
CAL COMMUNITY
This subsection analyzes the interaction between the rm and the local community.
The rm cannot have a direct access to each farmer group, so that it cannot have an
exact information on how each farmer group behaves. However, the rm knows that the
local community interacts with them by a use of community signal though it does not
know how it works. The rm cannot interfere with the interaction between the local
community and farmer groups. The rm relies on the local community for transferring
relevant information, either the average level of eort for R&D by farmer groups or a
prole of eorts for R&D by farmer groups, and would like to pay an incentive m to the
local community in return for the information. The rm can inuence the behavior of
farmer groups indirectly by controlling the starting wage level w through the announced
wage payment scheme. The interaction between the rm and the local community is
explained by a bargaining between the rm and the local community. The rm would like
to have a true information about either
P5
j=1 
j
1
5 or
n
j1
o5
j=1
. The rm is willing to pay an
incentive m to the local community if the budget allows. The local community can accept
the proposal of incentive payment or reject it. The rm wants to make that a rejection
of the proposal by the local community signals that
P5
j=1 
j
1
5 is less than , the average
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level of eort required for a smooth operation of R&D. If it happens, the rm raises the
starting wage at a pre-specied rate. The rm wants to make that the acceptance of the
proposal by the local community guarantees that
P5
j=1 
j
1
5  .
Let us consider the two players involved in this interaction: the local community and
the rm as players. The rm needs the true information about the average eort level for
R&D from the local community. The rm approaches the local community and gives an
incentive payment to tell the true value of either the average eort level or the eort level
chosen by each farmer group after several interactions between it and farmer groups. It
is assumed that the incentive will be paid only after the rm observes the true value of
j1 for each farmer group j by employing them. The rm retains the right to refuse the
incentive payment if the true average value is dierent from the reported average from the
local community. As a consequence, the local community gives the true information if it
accepts the proposal. At rst, the rm makes a proposal about an incentive pay and a
waiting time. Then the local community decides to accept or reject the proposal within
the waiting time by interacting with farmer groups. The budget for R&D division, , is
informed to the local community before the bargaining begins.
The rm?s rst proposal is represented by a pair (m; ) wherem   5w() and  > 0
is a waiting time for a decision by the local community. The local community runs the
interaction with farmer groups within . If
n
j1
o5
j=1
is obtained as the result of interactions
within , the local community knows that an accurate estimation of the labor cost isP5
j=1w(
j
1) and its estimate based on the average eort is 5w
P5
j=1 
j
1
5

. So the expected
incentive pay by the local community is either  P5j=1w(j1) or   5wP5j=1 j15 . The
local community has two choices in what information it gives to the rm, either
n
j1
o5
j=1
orP5
j=1 
j
1
5 . The one which gives a higher expected incentive pay is chosen as an information
to be transfered. Hence
P5
j=1 
j
1
5 is to be transfered if w
P5
j=1 
j
1
5


P5
j=1 w(
j
1)
5 ,
n
j1
o5
j=1
is to be informed otherwise. Either information is transfered to the rm if the proposal is
accepted. The local community accepts the proposal if
m  max
8<:  
5X
j=1
w(j1);    5w
 P5
j=1 
j
1
5
!9=; ;
and rejects the proposal otherwise. Since m =    5w(), the acceptance by the local
community means    5w()     5w
P5
j=1 
j
1
5

, hence
P5
j=1 
j
1
5   since w() is
increasing in . Therefore the rm guarantees the required average level of eort for R&D
if the local community accepts the proposal.
If the local community rejects the proposal,
P5
j=1 
j
1
5 <  if w
P5
j=1 
j
1
5


P5
j=1 w(
j
1)
5 .
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Then the rm raises w by a preset percentage rate and make a new rst proposal based
on the new wage payment scheme determined by the increased w.
If the local community accepts the proposal, then the information either
n
j1
o5
j=1
orP5
j=1 
j
1
5 is transfered to the rm. Then the rm makes a concluding proposal (m; 0) where
m =    5w
P5
j=1 
j
1
5

if
P5
j=1 
j
1
5 is informed and m =   
P5
j=1w(
j
1) if
n
j1
o5
j=1
is
informed, only if m > 0. The local community has no reason to reject this proposal since
the budget and the ex-ante estimates of labor payment are known to it. The rejection
leads to the increase of the labor payment. Since the budget is constant, it decreases the
incentive pay to the local community. Hence it accepts the concluding proposal. Finally, a
contract of incentive payment is completed with the acceptance of the concluding proposal.
If m < 0, the rm abandons the plan to install the R&D division in that region so that
there is no installment of the R&D division.
2.3.5 IMPLICATION OF RESULTS
The results of the interaction model imply that conditions for a successful installment of
the business proposal are 1) Agricultural activities in the area are not going very well,
2) marginal utilities of income for farmers are suciently high, and 3) the mechanism to
create a peer eect is not coercive.
The results also imply that the R&D division can be installed in rural areas without
making farmers give up agricultural activities. The farmer groups are capable of making
a balance between agricultural activities and work for R&D.
Yet another implication is that the rm does not need to know about the local com-
munity and farmers in detail, such as a religion and regional characteristics of agricultural
activities, and do not need to care or understand anything about them. The R&D division
of a rm relies on a peer eect in the interaction between the local community and farmer
groups to sustain the level of average eort by workers at the degree of a smooth operation.
As an intention of the theoretical analysis, the rm may be able to set the average level of
eort for R&D of PHA slightly lower than that for R&D of other than PHA. It is because
that the determinants of the level of eort in the R&D division would be dominated by
work experiences and cooperative behavior in the case of R&D for PHA.
